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Country Club Sports:  
The Disparate Impact of Athlete Admissions at  
Elite Universities 
William B. Morrison* 
While conservative advocacy groups criticize affirmative 
action as anti-meritocratic, many universities give similar 
admissions preferences based on ostensibly race-neutral 
characteristics that highly correlate with wealth and whiteness. 
Using data made public through the recent legal challenge to 
Harvard’s affirmative action policies, statisticians have shown 
that the greatest boost to an applicant’s admission chances at elite 
universities is not minority status or high test scores, but rather 
appearing on a coach’s list of potential recruits. At Harvard, 
where 70% of athletes are white, these athletic recruitment lists 
are often for “country club sports” that require expensive tutoring 
and are rarely played outside of predominantly white suburbs. 
Our current legislative framework is insufficient to challenge 
facially race-neutral admissions policies that have the effect of 
discriminating on the basis of race, like athlete preferences.  
In response, I propose legislative modifications to Title VI and 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the recent case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President 
& Fellows of Harvard,1 a nonprofit challenged Harvard’s admissions 
policy as unlawfully discriminating on the basis of race. The 
nonprofit, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), alleges Harvard’s 
use of affirmative action to benefit African American and Hispanic 
applicants is a “thinly disguised quota system” that overly burdens 
Asian American applicants.2 Harvard asserts that affirmative 
action is the most effective method for it to achieve its compelling 
interest in diversity.3 The lengthy trial resulted in a ruling in favor  
of Harvard.4 Finding no error in the trial court opinion, the 
 
 1. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980 
F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020).  
 2. Camille G. Caldera, Lead Trial Lawyer for SFFA Criticizes Ruling in Harvard 
Admissions Lawsuit, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.thecrimson.com/ 
article/2019/10/9/sffa-lawyer-criticizes-ruling/. 
 3. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 
F. Supp. 3d 126, 133–34, 177 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[N]o workable 
race-neutral alternatives will currently permit Harvard to achieve the level of racial diversity 
it has credibly found necessary for its educational mission.”). 
 4. Id. at 204–06. 
5.MORRISON_FIN_ONLINE.NH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2021  1:51 AM 
885 Disparate Impact of Athlete Admissions 
 885 
 
First Circuit affirmed.5 Nevertheless, SFFA intends to take the case 
to the Supreme Court.6 
Though SFFA v. Harvard presents new questions to affirmative 
action jurisprudence—unlike past cases, the plaintiffs are Asian 
American,7 and the defending university is a private institution—
the case falls in line with affirmative action cases previously 
decided by the Supreme Court. The crux of the decision in SFFA v. 
Harvard, as it was in Grutter v. Bollinger8 and Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke,9 was the school’s compelling interest in 
diversity.10 Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court of the United 
States determined the benefits of diversity outweigh the racial 
discrimination inherent to affirmative action.11 Because Harvard 
demonstrated it has a compelling interest in diversity and that its 
affirmative action policy is the most efficient way of achieving that 
interest, its case has prevailed thus far.12 
However, despite its use of affirmative action to admit diverse 
students, Harvard uses several other ostensibly race-neutral 
admissions preferences that help admit white applicants.13 Harvard 
gives advantages in admissions based on an applicant’s status as an 
 
 5.  Students for Fair Admissions, 980 F.3d at 204. 
 6. Bianca Quilantan, Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Harvard in Affirmative Action Case, 
Paving Way for Supreme Court Challenge, POLITICO (Nov. 12, 2020, 10:17 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/12/harvard-affirmative-action-case-ruling-
436282 (describing Edward Blum, president of SFFA, as “vow[ing]” to take the case to the 
Supreme Court). 
 7. For a compelling indictment of SFFA’s use of Asian American plaintiffs to muddle 
the affirmative action debate, see Jonathan P. Feingold, SFFA v. Harvard: How Affirmative 
Action Myths Mask White Bonus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 707 (2019). 
 8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–30 (2003). 
 9. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978). 
 10. Students for Fair Admissions, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 133–34, 203–06; see also Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210–13 (2016). Edward Blum, the conservative 
activist who is funding the SFFA case also organized the plaintiffs in Fisher. See Anemona 
Hartocollis, He Took on the Voting Rights Act and Won. Now He’s Taking on Harvard,  
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/us/affirmative-action-
lawsuits.html. 
 11. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (“[T]he State has a substantial interest [in diversity] that 
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the 
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.”). 
 12. Students for Fair Admissions, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 203–04. 
 13. For the purposes of this paper, “white” refers to white individuals who are not 
Hispanic or Latino. 
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athlete, legacy applicant,14 dean’s list applicant,15 or as the child of 
a faculty member.16 Together, these admissions preferences are 
referred to as ALDC tips. Unlike the admissions preferences 
granted to minority applicants through affirmative action, ALDC 
tips do not advance diversity. In fact, by advantaging white 
applicants, they actively hinder it. 
Peter S. Arcidiacono, an economics professor at Duke 
University who acted as the expert witness for SFFA in their lawsuit 
against Harvard, recently co-authored a study of ALDC 
preferences at Harvard.17 Using data made publicly available 
through the Harvard litigation, the study analyzed the magnitude 
and racial skew of ALDC tips.18 Arcidiacono and his co-authors 
found that not only are the vast majority of ALDC applicants 
white,19 but that, without their preferred status, three quarters of 
admitted white ALDC applicants would have been rejected.20 
Whereas less than 16% of admitted minorities received an ALDC 
preference, more than 43% of admitted white applicants did.21 
White students given spots at Harvard due to their ALDC status 
take up spots in the admitted class of students, pushing out 
 
 14. Legacy applicants are those with immediate family who attended the  
university they are applying to. See Joe Pinsker, The Real Reasons Legacy  
Preferences Exist, ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/ 
archive/2019/04/legacy-admissions-preferences-ivy/586465/. 
 15. Applicants on the dean’s list are generally those whose families have donated 
large sums of money to the university. See Delano R. Franklin & Samuel W. Zwickel,  
In Admissions, Harvard Favors Those Who Fund It, Internal Emails Show, HARV. CRIMSON  
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/10/18/day-three-harvard-
admissions-trial/. 
 16. Peter Arcidiacono, Josh Kinsler & Tyler Ransom, Legacy and Athlete Preferences at 
Harvard 15–16 (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26316, 2019), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26316.pdf. The influence of these race-neutral factors 
became a central component of another admissions controversy: the “Varsity Blues” scandal, 
where wealthy parents bribed coaches to include their children on athlete lists that would 
essentially guarantee their acceptance into an elite college. See Karen Weintraub & Nick 
Anderson, Several Coaches Plead Not Guilty in College Admissions Bribery Scandal, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 25, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/coaches-
are-expected-in-federal-court-to-face-charges-in-college-admissions-bribery-scandal/2019/ 
03/25/f18beab4-4f08-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html. 
 17. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 2–7. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 42. 
 20. Id. at 49. 
 21. Id. at 16. 
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minorities who would have otherwise been admitted.22 The 
numbers are clear: ALDC tips benefit white students to the 
detriment of minorities. 
Legacy preferences at elite universities have been largely 
criticized because they give an extra benefit to applicants who 
already have the privilege of highly educated parents.23 However, 
athlete preferences, though seen as meritocratic, provide an even 
greater admissions boost than other ALDC considerations and have 
a similar correlation with privilege. At Harvard, where athletes 
make up 20% of the student body and squash and rowing have as 
much support as football and basketball,24 white applicants 
comprise the only ethnic or racial group benefitted by athlete 
preferences overall.25 As such, athlete preferences at elite 
 
 22. Id. at 42. 
 23. See, e.g., Kathryn Ladewski, Preserving a Racial Hierarchy: A Legal Analysis of the 
Disparate Racial Impact of Legacy Preferences in University Admissions, 108 MICH. L. REV. 577 
(2010); John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preference at Harvard and Yale, 
26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491 (1993); The Editorial Board, Opinion, End Legacy College 
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/09/07/opinion/sunday/end-legacy-college-admissions.html; Gene Nichol, End the 
Legacy Preference in College Admissions, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 19, 2019, 6:53 PM) 
https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article228077844.html; Robert Verbruggen, 
Harvard’s ‘Legacy’ Preferences Are a National Disgrace, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 23, 2019, 6:30 AM) 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/harvard-legacy-preferences-national-disgrace/. 
 24. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 70; 2019–20 Harvard Men’s Squash Roster, 
GOCRIMSON, https://gocrimson.prestosports.com/sports/msquash/2019-20/roster (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2020); 2019–20 Harvard Women’s Squash Roster, GOCRIMSON, 
https://gocrimson.com/sports/womens-squash/roster/2019-20 (last visited Oct. 21, 2020); 
2019–20 Men’s Basketball Roster, GOCRIMSON, https://gocrimson.com/sports/mens-
basketball/roster (last visited Oct. 21, 2020); 2019–20 Men’s Heavyweight Crew Roster, 
GOCRIMSON, https://gocrimson.com/sports/mens-heavyweight-rowing/roster (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2020); 2018–19 Men’s Lightweight Crew Roster, GOCRIMSON, 
https://gocrimson.com/sports/mens-lightweight-rowing/roster/2018-19 (last visited  
Oct. 21, 2020); 2019–20 Radcliffe Heavyweight Crew Roster, GOCRIMSON, 
https://gocrimson.com/sports/womens-heavyweight-rowing/roster/2019-20 (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2020); 2019–20 Radcliffe Lightweight Crew Roster, GOCRIMSON, 
https://gocrimson.com/sports/womens-lightweight-rowing/roster/2019-20 (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2020); Football–2019 Roster, GOCRIMSON, https://gocrimson.com/sports/ 
football/roster/2019 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); Harvard Women’s Basketball 2019–20 Roster, 
GOCRIMSON, https://gocrimson.com/sports/womens-basketball/roster/2019-20 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2020). Counting the players listed on its rosters online, Harvard has 34 
basketball players, 108 football players, 189 rowers, and 25 squash players. 
 25. See Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 32. Though some individual  
nonwhite students benefit from athlete preferences, the net effect of removing athlete 
preferences as a whole is either positive (Asian, Hispanic) or neutral (Black) for nonwhite 
racial/ethnic groups. Id. 
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universities essentially have the effect of affirmative action for 
white applicants.26 
This Note adds to the current academic discussion by exploring 
the viability of disparate impact challenges to athlete admissions 
preferences. In Part I, I briefly summarize the current legal process 
for making a disparate impact claim on the basis of race in 
university admissions. Then, in Part II, I review how that 
framework has been used in analyses of racial disparate impact in 
other areas of university admissions, namely standardized test 
scores and legacy preferences. After establishing this background, 
I apply the disparate impact framework to athlete preferences in 
Part III, showing that, even though Ivy League athlete preferences 
have a clear disparate impact on applicants of color, our current 
jurisprudence would be unlikely to support such a claim. In Part 
IV, I propose legislation that would facilitate lawsuits against 
universities for policies that have the effect of discriminating on the 
basis of race. Lastly, in Part V, I propose changes that Harvard and 
other Ivy League universities could make that would mitigate the 
discriminatory impact of athlete preferences. I conclude with some 
brief remarks on the importance of combatting all discrimination, 
even when its scope seems relatively innocuous, as it does here. 
I. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS 
AGAINST UNIVERSITIES 
Disparate impact claims are generally made under either the 
Fourteenth Amendment or a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.27 Because the Fourteenth Amendment applies to government 
action and not private action,28 it may not be used in an action 
against private universities, like those in the Ivy League. Therefore, 
subjects of disparate impact discrimination through private 
university admissions must make their claims through Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,29 which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin in activities or programs that 
 
 26. Because they are unlikely to receive a bump from ALDC tips and ineligible for an 
affirmative action boost, Asian American applicants are in an especially difficult position 
when applying to elite universities. 
 27. Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1143 (2010). 
 28. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
 29. Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory to 
Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111, 1117–18 (2002). 
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receive federal funding.30 Harvard receives federal funding, so it is 
subject to Title VI.31 
Disparate impact litigation under Title VI is difficult. First, 
Title VI does not contain a cause of action for disparate impact; the 
action is only available due to a Department of Education 
regulation that prohibits federal involvement with programs that 
“have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because 
of their race, color, or national origin.”32 In Alexander v. Sandoval, 
the Supreme Court ruled that no such right existed because the 
regulation was promulgated under a section of Title VI that did not 
create a private right of action for disparate impact claims.33 
Though some scholars,34 including a dissenting Justice Stevens,35 
believe a disparate impact private right of action could be 
authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such a path to litigation has not 
been tested in the nineteen years since Sandoval. 
With no private right of action available, the Department of 
Education holds the keys to Title VI disparate impact litigation 
against universities. The Department of Education may investigate 
disparate impact complaints filed by private parties and refer cases 
to the Department of Justice,36 but its resources are limited. 
Commentators have highlighted the inefficiencies of agency 
bureaucracy and the influence of private rights of action in swaying 
public opinion in the civil rights movement.37 
 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 31. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 
F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020) (“Although Harvard is not 
a state actor . . . Harvard University . . . receives federal funds and intentionally provides tips 
in its admissions process based on students’ race. Harvard [University] is therefore subject 
to the same standards that the Equal Protection Clause imposes upon state actors for the 
purposes of a Title VI claim.” (citation omitted)); ADAM ANDRZEJEWSKI & THOMAS W. SMITH, 
OPEN THE BOOKS, OVERSIGHT REPORT: IVY LEAGUE, INC. (2017). 
 32. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1980); Braceras, supra note 29, at 1118. 
 33. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–88 (2001). 
 34. William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-in-Headwinds”: An 
Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 176–83 (2002). 
 35. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299–300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 36. Brence D. Pernell, Aligning “Educational Necessity” with Title VI: An Enhanced 
Regulatory Role for Executive Agencies in Title VI Disparate Impact Enforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1369, 1380 (2015). 
 37. Dan McCaughey, Note, The Death of Disparate Impact Under Title VI: Alexander v. 
Sandoval and Its Effects on Private Challenges to High-Stakes Testing Programs, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
247, 274 (2004) (citing Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy,  
3 YALE J. ON REGUL. 167, 168 (1985)). 
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Furthermore, the loss of a private right of action leaves the 
decision of whether to pursue Title VI disparate impact claims up 
to the discretion of the executive branch, which may disagree with 
antidiscrimination policies. For example, the Trump administration 
has considered removing disparate impact regulations entirely.38 
As such, government protections from indirect discrimination are 
largely inconsistent. 
Additionally, due to its investigatory procedures, if the 
Department of Education chooses not to pursue a claim, courts are 
unable to create case law to guide future litigation. If the 
Department rules against a university following an investigation, 
schools may simply comply with the ruling to avoid enforcement 
litigation in federal court. For example, in 1988, the Department 
opened investigations into Harvard and UCLA for admissions 
procedures that allegedly had discriminatory effects against Asian 
Americans.39 Ultimately, the Department determined Harvard had 
not discriminated against Asian American applicants, but that 
UCLA had.40 UCLA modified its policies to comply with the order 
issued by the Department and made belated offers to previously 
rejected Asian American students.41 Were these actions pursued 
privately, they would have likely resulted in—at the very least—
motions to dismiss that could have helped fill gaps in our scant 
Title VI disparate impact jurisprudence. However, because the 
Department of Education resolved the claims without contact with 
a courtroom, disparate impact standards remain ambiguous. 
Because Title VI jurisprudence is so undeveloped,42 courts often 
interpret it through the lens of Title VII.43 Title VI and Title VII are 
largely similar: whereas Title VI prohibits discrimination on the 
 
 38. Laura Meckler & Devlin Barrett, Trump Administration Considers Rollback  
of Anti-Discrimination Rules, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administration-considers-rollback-
of-anti-discrimination-rules/2019/01/02/f96347ea-046d-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html. 
 39. Note, The Harvard Plan That Failed Asian Americans, 131 HARV. L. REV. 604, 607 
(2017). Though these actions were pursued before Sandoval struck down a private cause of 
action for disparate impact under Title VI and likely could have been made by private 
plaintiffs, no private plaintiff brought a claim to federal court. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Braceras, supra note 29, at 1147 (describing Title VII as the “Disparate Impact 
Prototype” in the title of the section). 
 43. Pernell, supra note 36, at 1393–95. 
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basis of race, color, or national origin in programs receiving federal 
financial assistance,44 Title VII prohibits employers from engaging 
in that same discrimination.45 Nevertheless, there is not explicit 
parity between Title VII and Title VI disparate impact 
interpretation.46 While several circuit courts have determined that 
Title VI disparate analysis should follow Title VII jurisprudence 
directly,47 the Supreme Court has yet to affirm this ruling. 
In accordance with circuit court precedents, establishing a 
disparate impact racial discrimination claim follows a burden-
shifting framework.48 First, plaintiffs must establish the challenged 
program has a substantial disparate racial impact.49 In a Title VII 
employment context, the Supreme Court has avoided rigid 
mathematical formulas, instead requiring plaintiffs to show that the 
racial disparity is “sufficiently substantial” to raise an “inference of 
causation.”50 Several numerical tests have been employed by courts 
to determine whether a “legally significant statistical disparity 
exists.”51 Courts may also weigh statistical disparities with their 
“practical impact,” considering the larger societal effects of  
the disparity.52 
After plaintiffs establish the challenged program has a 
substantial disparate impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
demonstrate the program is “educationally justified.”53 This 
standard, known as educational necessity, originates from the 
 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion 
or sex. Discrimination on the basis of sex in federally assisted programs is prohibited by 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
 46. Braceras, supra note 29, at 1149 (“[T]he lack of consensus as to the theoretical basis 
of disparate impact law requires that each attempt to transfer the model to a body of law 
outside of the employment arena be judged separately and on its own merits.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing N.Y. Urb. League, 
Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995)) (overruled on other grounds by 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 829 & 
n.12 (7th Cir. 1995); Elston v. Talladega Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 
1993)); see also Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 48. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 34, at 183–84. 
 49. Id. at 183. 
 50. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988). 
 51. GI Forum Image De Tejas v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675 (W.D. 
Tex. 2000). 
 52. Id. at 676. 
 53. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 34, at 183–84. 
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business necessity exception in Title VII jurisprudence.54 To 
establish educational necessity, as with business necessity, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the challenged practice is related 
to success within the institution.55 
If a school can demonstrate that its admissions practice is an 
educational necessity, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiffs, 
requiring them to show that there is “an equally effective and less 
discriminatory alternative.”56 This standard is exacting. Even if a 
plaintiff can demonstrate a less discriminatory alternative exists, as 
long as the effectively discriminatory policy is at least slightly better 
at accomplishing the university’s stated educational necessity, the 
university may keep its original policy.57 Though a Title VI 
disparate impact claim, unlike one made under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,58 does not explicitly require plaintiffs to demonstrate 
discriminatory intent,59 current jurisprudence makes it difficult for 
a disparate impact claim to prevail without it.60 
II. PREVIOUS DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS AGAINST  
ADMISSIONS POLICIES 
Although no federal court has heard a case alleging disparate 
racial impact based on athletic admissions preferences in 
universities, courts have found racially discriminatory effects  
in several related areas. This section will review disparate  
 
 54. Ga. State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1418  
(11th Cir. 1985) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 34, at 184 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR CIV. 
RTS., THE USE OF TESTS AS PART OF HIGH-STAKES DECISION-MAKING FOR STUDENTS:  
A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS AND POLICY-MAKERS 54–58 (2000)). 
 57. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,  
397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 177–83 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020). SFFA identifies 
several less discriminatory alternatives to affirmative action, but, because the alternatives 
would not allow Harvard to achieve its educational goal—in this case, diversity—at the same 
level as it does with affirmative action, the alternatives do not meet the equally effective and 
less discriminatory standard. Though looking at direct discrimination and not disparate 
impact discrimination, the “equally effective and less discriminatory” standard the court 
uses here is the same. 
 58. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976). 
 59. Guardians Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983). 
 60. See id. at 584 (“[U]nless discriminatory intent is shown, declaratory and limited 
injunctive relief should be the only available private remedies for Title VI violations.”). 
However, this drawback is mostly irrelevant because the Department of Education is the 
only entity currently allowed to bring forth Title VI disparate impact claims. 
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impact claims against standardized tests and legacy admissions. 
However, due to the decision in Sandoval prohibiting Title VI from 
being used in a private disparate impact claim, much of the 
surrounding case law is from before 2001. Because the area has been 
largely abandoned for nearly two decades, it is difficult to 
accurately predict how modern courts will approach the subject. 
Nevertheless, these analogues provide helpful insight on how 
courts have traditionally approached disparate impact claims in 
higher education.   
A. High-Stakes Decision-Making Tests 
Much of the case law in disparate impact Title VI claims  
involve attempts to strike down standardized tests that schools use 
in high- stakes decision-making.61 For example, in Larry P. ex rel. 
Lucille P. v. Riles,62 the Ninth Circuit found that an IQ test used  
to place a disproportionate amount of African American  
children into special classes for individuals with mental disabilities 
was not educationally necessary because the state could not 
establish the test was able to accurately identify mentally 
handicapped individuals.63 
In Larry P., the evidence of disparate impact was 
overwhelming: in the 1968 school year, even though black children 
made up only about 9% of the state school population, they 
comprised 27% of the population classified as “educable mentally 
retarded” by the standardized test.64 The plaintiffs’ expert witness 
testified that the “overenrollments could not be the result of 
chance” and that “there [was] a less than a one in a million chance 
that the overenrollment of black children and the underenrollment 
of non-black children in [classes for the mentally retarded] would 
have resulted under a color-blind system.”65 
 
 61. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., THE USE OF TESTS AS PART OF HIGH-
STAKES DECISION-MAKING FOR STUDENTS, at ii (2000) (“Examples of high-stakes decisions 
include: student placement in gifted and talented programs or in programs serving students 
with limited English proficiency; determinations of disability and eligibility to receive special 
education services; student promotion from one grade level to another; graduation from high 
school and diploma awards; and admission decisions and scholarship awards.”). 
 62. Lucille P. ex rel. Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 63. Id. at 981–83. 
 64. Id. at 973. 
 65. Id. at 973. 
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The burden then shifted to the school districts to rebut the 
prima facie claim by showing the policy was an educational 
necessity. The school districts could not do so because the 
standardized test they used as the sole determinate of an 
individual’s placement in classes for the mentally retarded was not 
properly validated for its specific purpose.66 As such, the court 
found that the school districts had violated Title VI due to the 
disparate impact of the policy, even though the court did not find 
the school districts intended to discriminate.67 
In Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia,68 a 
group of black schoolchildren had less success with a similar claim. 
At the time of the case, many schools in Georgia assigned students 
to classes based on their level of academic achievement, which was 
usually determined by scores on standardized tests.69 Black 
schoolchildren, supported by the NAACP, alleged Georgia school 
districts’ use of “achievement grouping” violated Title VI because 
it disproportionately placed black students in classes with fewer 
resources.70 At trial, the district court judge found that the plaintiffs 
had established a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing 
that the racial composition of achievement-based classrooms 
differed from what a random distribution would predict.71 The 
circuit court did not question this prima facie finding because it 
instead determined the policy was educationally necessary.72 
To evaluate educational necessity, the circuit court  
merely assumed that the tests were properly vetted as implicit 
within the district judge’s opinion, which failed to mention the 
subject.73 This was improper; the adequacy of a test is a key 
component of establishing educational necessity and should  
be directly supported, not merely implied. Under this loose 
standard, the school districts successfully demonstrated 
 
 66. Id. at 980–83. 
 67. Id. at 983–84. 
 68. Ga. State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 69. See id. at 1409–11. 
 70. Id. at 1408. 
 71. Id. at 1417. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1420 (citing Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1334 (4th Cir. 1974)). 
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educational necessity and rebutted the disparate impact identified 
by the schoolchildren.74 
Because the school districts had established educational 
necessity, the burden shifted back to the schoolchildren to propose 
less discriminatory and equally effective alternatives.75 The court 
found that the alternative to achievement grouping that plaintiffs 
proposed—randomly assigned classes—was insufficient because 
they could not demonstrate its superiority over achievement 
grouping.76 Even though the scientific evidence supporting 
achievement grouping was mixed at best,77 the Eleventh Circuit 
found the alternative insufficient because the plaintiffs could not 
provide evidence that would demonstrate integrated grouping 
would produce the same educational benefits as achievement 
grouping.78 Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP shows 
that the current framework tips the odds in defendants’ favor. 
Defendants were able to continue using effectively discriminatory 
policies because the court deferred to the school’s assertion that 
those policies helped to achieve a valid educational goal. 
Standardized college admissions tests like the SAT and ACT 
have been criticized for their racial disparate impact.79 Those who 
benefit from a high score on a standardized test—college applicants 
whose test scores are higher than their GPAs would predict— 
are disproportionally white and male.80 Likewise, those who are 
harmed by standardized tests—college applicants whose test 
scores are lower than their GPAs would predict—are 
disproportionately women and racial minorities.81 Though this 
discrepancy is partially explained by correlations between race and 
socioeconomic status, white students from families with incomes of 
 
 74. Id. at 1420. 
 75. Id. at 1420–21. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Comment, Ability Grouping in Public Schools: A Threat to Equal Protection?, 1 CONN. 
L. REV. 150 (1968). 
 78. Ga. State Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1420. 
 79. See Kidder & Rosner, supra note 34; Benjamin Landy, Why It’s Time for Colleges to 
Rethink the SAT, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 21, 2014), https://tcf.org/content/ 
commentary/why-its-time-for-colleges-to-rethink-the-sat/?session=1. 
 80. Krista D. Mattern, Emily J. Shaw & Jennifer L. Kobrin, A Case for Not Going SAT-
Optional: Students with Discrepant SAT and HSGPA Performance, COLLEGEBOARD  
(May 3, 2010), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED563419.pdf. 
 81. Id. 
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less than $10,000 still have significantly higher SAT scores than the 
national mean for all African Americans.82 Others have theorized 
the racial disparity is due to more limited resources and attention 
given to black students.83 Furthermore, the history of college 
admissions testing itself is mired in racist ideology; the first 
standardized college admissions test, the SAT, was created by a 
eugenicist with the primary purpose of proving white supremacy.84 
Increased understanding of these disparities has led some schools 
to drop their standardized testing requirements for 
undergraduates, including, most prominently, the University of 
California system of schools.85 
Though federal litigation challenging the SAT has dropped off 
since Sandoval,86 the pre-Sandoval cases demonstrate the potential of 
Title VI disparate impact claims. In Cureton v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association,87 a federal district court granted summary 
judgment for a disparate impact claim against the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) for its use of SAT scores as 
a cutoff for athletes to compete. The plaintiffs established a prima 
facie case by showing the SAT cutoff would result in the 
ineligibility of approximately 25% of black athletes, but only 
 
 82. The Widening Racial Scoring Gap on the SAT College Admissions Test, 29 J. BLACKS 
HIGHER EDUC. 88 (2005). 
 83. The SAT as a Major Roadblock to Black Students’ Aspirations to Higher Education,  
29 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 85, 85–88 (2000). 
 84. Sidney Fussell, The Problem with the SAT’s Idea of Objectivity, ATLANTIC  
(May 18, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/05/college-
board-sat-adversity-score/589681/. 
 85. Press Release, Univ. of Cal., University of California Board of Regents 
Unanimously Approved Changes to Standardized Testing Requirement for Undergraduates 
(May 21, 2020), https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/press-room/university-california-
board-regents-approves-changes-standardized-testing-requirement. 
 86. But see Anemona Hartocollis, University of California Is Sued over Use of SAT and 
ACT in Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/12/10/us/sat-act-uc-lawsuit.html. A coalition of students recently challenged the 
University of California system of colleges for its use of standardized testing in admissions. 
Id. However, the plaintiffs sued in state court, arguing the use of standardized tests violates 
the equal protection clause in the California Constitution. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiffs 
alleged direct discrimination, not Title VI disparate impact discrimination. Id. The case was 
made moot by the University of California’s decision to drop its standardized testing 
requirement for undergraduates. See Univ. of Cal., supra note 85. 
 87. Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
(reversed on other grounds by Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 198 F.3d 107 
(3d Cir. 1999)). 
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roughly 5% of white athletes.88 The NCAA attempted to rebut this 
with a claim that SAT cutoffs were an educational necessity to 
improve student athlete graduation rates and close the graduation 
gap between black and white athletes.89 
This argument did not persuade the district court. The court 
found the NCAA had not validated the SAT or the ACT as 
predictors of student-athlete graduation rates and that the cutoff 
was “abstractly rational,” looking only at SAT scores to predict 
graduation and failing to include important variables like high 
school grades and other forms of academic achievement.90 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs provided different models to predict 
academic achievement that had resulted in similar graduation rates 
as the NCAA’s SAT/ACT cutoff but with a less racially 
discriminatory effect.91 Noteworthy here is that the different 
models have slightly lower predicted graduation rates than the 
NCAA’s SAT/ACT cutoff.92 However, because the NCAA’s only 
stated goal was to increase graduation rates and all of the plans did 
so, the court found the NAACP’s models equally effective as the 
NCAA’s.93 Despite its later reversal on separate grounds,94  
Cureton provides a helpful blueprint of a successful disparate 
impact claim against testing procedures.95 
Getting rid of standardized college admissions testing entirely, 
however, is a much more difficult legal battle. The Department  
of Education could likely establish a prima facie claim based  
on the disparate impact that standardized admissions tests  
have on minorities, but universities can demonstrate that their use 
is educationally justified because they help admissions staff create 
a more qualified incoming class. Standardized admissions test 
scores have been shown in several studies to help predict 
 
 88. Id. at 698. 
 89. Id. at 701. 
 90. Id. at 708–10. 
 91. Id. at 713–14. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 714. 
 94. Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing 
without criticizing the disparate impact analysis after finding that the NCAA had not 
received federal funds and therefore was not subject to Title VI). 
 95. See also Sharif by Salahuddin v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t., 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (ruling that merit scholarships based solely on SAT scores have an unjustified disparate 
impact on women under Title IX). 
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applicants’ college GPAs and graduation rates.96 Universities have 
a strong interest in recruiting the best students possible and 
therefore would be likely to prove test scores are a legitimate means 
of effecting that goal. Though litigants could argue an admissions 
scheme that does not use standardized test scores is equally as 
effective as one that does,97 standardized tests provide a slight 
bump in predictive power that likely would overcome the equal 
effectiveness standard.98 As such, courts lack the means to remedy 
the negative effects of standardized admissions tests on 
underrepresented minorities. 
B. Legacy Admissions 
Many universities provide an admissions bump to applicants 
whose parents graduated from the university, work as faculty, or 
have made large donations to the university.99 These tips are 
significant; a survey of 30 highly selective colleges and universities 
found that legacy status more than tripled an applicant’s odds of 
admission.100 Though the Department of Education’s Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR) found in its 1990 investigation of Harvard that 
 
 96. Christopher M. Berry & Paul R. Sackett, Individual Differences in Course Choice 
Result in Underestimation of the Validity of College Admissions Systems, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 822 (2009); 
Mattern et al., supra note 80. 
 97. This argument may be gaining more traction with time. See Paul Tough,  
What College Admissions Offices Really Want, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/10/magazine/college-admissions-paul-
tough.html. Universities that have removed their standardized testing requirement have 
found no significant difference between the grades of those who choose not to submit  
their scores and those who do. Id. After introducing this practice and thereafter dropping 
down in ranks on U.S. News’s list of best liberal arts colleges, professors at Trinity College 
urged its board of trustees to continue with the policy of allowing applicants to choose not 
to submit their test scores in their application. Id. The professors described the new students 
as having “a refreshing array of qualities that were all too rare in prior years: intellectual 
curiosity, openness of mind and spirit and genuine will to engage with their peers,” and 
regarded the change as “one of the most exciting transformations Trinity has witnessed in 
many years.” Id. 
 98. Braceras, supra note 29, at 1193 (describing such a line of thinking as “unwarranted 
intrusions into education policy”). 
 99. Steve D. Shadowen, Personal Dignity, Equal Opportunity, and the Elimination of 
Legacy Preferences, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 31, 31–32 (2010) (citing Chad Coffman, 
Tara O’Neil & Brian Starr, An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Legacy Preferences on Alumni 
Giving at Top Universities, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN 
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 101, 119–21 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.) (2010)). 
 100. Michael Hurwitz, The Impact of Legacy Status on Undergraduate Admissions at Elite 
Colleges and Universities, 30 ECON. EDUC. REV. 480 (2011). 
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its policy of legacy preferences did not violate Title VI 
regulations,101 the OCR only looked into legacy preferences’ effect 
on Asian Americans, not other minority groups.102 Scholarship has 
since reasserted the viability of Title VI in striking down legacy 
admissions policies.103 Despite a disparate impact on the basis of 
race, universities claim to have a strong interest in maintaining 
legacy admissions,104 primarily based on the belief that it increases 
alumni donations.105 Ultimately, under our current judicial 
framework, successfully litigating a Title VI disparate impact claim 
for legacy admissions is unlikely given the deference courts 
provide universities in establishing educational necessity. 
The prima facie case of disparate impact on the basis of race 
here is strong. Because more overtly racist policies made previous 
generations of college students less diverse than today’s applicants, 
granting admissions based on past generations’ college attendance 
perpetuates the effects of direct discrimination from the past.106 
Legacy applicants are therefore overwhelmingly white.107 At 
Harvard, almost 70% of legacy applicants are white, 108 even though 
only 41% of Harvard applicants are white.109 For the first 
 
 101. See Lamb, supra note 23, at 508. Though the OCR acknowledged disparities in 
acceptance rates among white and Asian American applicants were largely due to Harvard’s 
legacy preferences and athlete recruitment, it concluded that legacy and athlete preferences 
had legitimate, nondiscriminatory purposes and therefore did not violate Title VI 
regulations. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Ladewski, supra note 23. 
 104. Lamb, supra note 23, at 508–09. 
 105. Pinsker, supra note 14. 
 106. Ladewski, supra note 23, at 583. 
 107. Jody David Armour, Hype and Reality in Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1173, 1197 (1997) (“At Harvard College, for instance, more whites gain entry as legacies than 
do all the black, Hispanic, and Native American students combined, including those 
admitted as part of the regular admissions stream and those who received special 
consideration in the admissions process as members of disadvantaged groups.”). 
 108. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 42. 
 109. Id. at 43. This number is derived from adding up the N value for white applicants 
and then dividing by the total N value for applicants. It appears other data submitted by 
Harvard differs; the court in SFFA v. Harvard cites to a non-public exhibit showing that 20% 
of applicants are Black or Hispanic (despite making up more than 30% of the U.S. population) 
and 22% are Asian American (despite making up less than 6% of the national population). 
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 
126, 177–79 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020). The trial exhibit from SFFA v. 
Harvard with more detailed applicant demographic information is not publicly available, but, 
assuming 2% of Harvard applicants are Native American or Pacific Islander, roughly 56% of 
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universities to institute legacy preferences, discrimination was a 
feature, not a bug: Harvard and Yale originated legacy preferences 
during the nationalist boom following World War I primarily to 
hinder Jewish-Americans’ chances of admittance.110 
However, legacy admissions serve several interests that 
universities can use to rebut a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination. The Department of Education dropped its 1990 
investigation of racial discrimination in Harvard admissions in 
response to Harvard’s assertion that it used legacy preferences to 
“1) encourage alumni volunteer services; 2) encourage alumni 
financial contributions; and, 3) maintain community relations.”111 
More recently, in SFFA v. Harvard, the court recognized that 
eliminating legacy tips, including applicants on the dean’s interest 
lists and children of faculty, would “adversely affect Harvard’s 
ability to attract top quality faculty and staff and to achieve desired 
benefits from relationships with its alumni and other individuals 
who have made significant contributions to Harvard.”112  
These effects are disputed,113 but, as with eliminating standardized 
tests,114 courts are currently ill-equipped to make the education 
policy decisions necessary to eliminate legacy admissions outright. 
III. DISPARATE IMPACT OF ATHLETE PREFERENCES AT HARVARD 
The disparate impact of athlete preferences at elite universities 
has received much less attention than legacy admissions. This is in 
part because athlete admissions lack the hypocrisy inherent in 
legacy admissions; whereas legacy preference essentially gives an 
affirmative action boost to privileged white people, athlete 
admissions at elite universities are earned through hard-fought 
 
Harvard applicants are white. Because Arcidiacono et al. have provided their data more 
transparently, I will use the 41% figure. However, even with the 56% figure, there is a 
significant disproportionality for ALDC tips to favor white applicants. 
 110. Ladewski, supra note 23, at 579–83. 
 111. Lamb, supra note 23, at 509 (quoting Statement of Findings of Office for Civil 
Rights, Compliance Review 01-88-6009 9 (1990)). 
 112. Students for Fair Admissions, 397 F. Supp. at 177–79. 
 113. Ladewski, supra note 23, at 585–91. Ladewski compared fundraising data for eight 
selective public universities from before and after they eliminated their legacy admissions 
preferences. Ladewski found no significant change in donations following the removal of 
legacy preferences. However, the results could be different when measuring ultra-selective 
private colleges like those in the Ivy League. 
 114. See supra Section II.A. 
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mastery in a sport.115 In some ways, athletes in the Ivy League are 
in a worse position than those at other universities because they do 
not receive scholarships.116 Nevertheless, Harvard grants 
admissions tips to athletes that are far greater than those it gives to 
legacy applicants or racial minorities.117 In Arcidiacono and his 
colleagues’ analysis of Harvard admissions data, they found that, 
while legacy status made an applicant eight times more likely to be 
admitted, athlete status made admission five thousand times more 
likely.118 In this Part, I first explain Harvard’s general admissions 
process, then I address the role of athletics in the Harvard’s culture. 
After establishing this factual background, I predict how courts 
would handle a Title VI disparate impact challenge to Harvard’s 
athlete preferences, using the burden-shifting framework 
explained in Part I. 
A. Harvard’s Admissions Process 
Harvard is one of the most selective universities in the  
world.119 Each year, over 40,000 students apply to Harvard;120 it 
admits roughly 5% of them,121 with its acceptance rate dwindling 
each year.122 In contrast, most colleges in the United States admit 
 
 115. But see Daniel Golden & Doris Burke, The Unseen Student Victims of the “Varsity 
Blues” College-Admissions Scandal, NEW YORKER (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-unseen-student-victims-of-the-
varsity-blues-college-admissions-scandal (finding some college athletes to have bought a 
spot on a team without even basic proficiency in their sport). 
 116. Prospective Athlete Information, IVY LEAGUE (July 28, 2017), 
https://ivyleague.com/sports/2017/7/28/information-psa-index.aspx. 
 117. Students for Fair Admissions, 397 F. Supp. at 199 (“The effect of African American 
and Hispanic racial identity on an applicant’s probability of admission has been estimated 
at a significantly lower magnitude than tips offered to recruited athletes, and is comparable 
to tips for legacies . . . .”). 
 118. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 6. 
 119. Top 100 – Lowest Acceptance Rates, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/best-
colleges/rankings/lowest-acceptance-rate (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 120. Admissions Statistics, HARV. COLL., https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/ 
admissions-statistics (last visited Sept. 17, 2020); Record 42,742 Apply to College Class of ’22, 
HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/02/record-
42742-apply-to-harvard-college-class-of-22/. 
 121. U.S. NEWS, supra note 119. 
 122. Camille G. Caldera & Sahar M. Mohammadzadeh, Record-Low 4.5 Percent of 
Harvard College Applicants Accepted to Class of 2023, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/3/29/2023-admit-numbers/; Delano R. 
Franklin & Samuel W. Zwickel, Record-Low 4.59 Percent of Applicants Accepted to Harvard Class 
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most of those who apply.123 To maintain its reputation and create 
the best freshman class possible, Harvard uses a sophisticated 
admissions regimen. 
Harvard generally requires applicants to provide a wide base 
of information, including: “standardized test scores, high school 
transcript(s), information about extracurricular and athletic 
activities, intended concentration and career, a personal statement, 
supplemental essays, teacher and guidance counselor 
recommendations,” and in-depth family and socioeconomic 
information.124 Admissions are based on a variety of factors, which 
are segmented into four metrics: academic, extracurricular, athletic, 
and personal.125 Harvard looks closely at non-academic credentials 
because “85 percent of [their] applicants are academically 
qualified[,]” requiring the Admissions Committee to instead focus 
on what makes an applicant distinctive.126 
Applications are reviewed by an admissions officer, who 
assigns ratings for each metric.127 These scores are generally ranked 
on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 marking the most qualified and 4 the least 
qualified.128 The scoring system also permits greater specificity by 
allowing admissions officers to give plus or minus scores, like 2+ 
or 3-.129 There is no direct formula to balancing an applicant’s scores 
in each metric, which are then weighed holistically in combination 
with tips the university gives to special groups like ALDCs and 
racial minorities to create an overall rating.130 Concurrent to the 
initial admissions officer review, though occasionally preceding it, 
most Harvard applicants are interviewed by a Harvard alumnus, 
 
of 2022, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/ 
article/2018/3/29/harvard-regular-admissions-2022/. 
 123. Drew Desilver, A Majority of U.S. Colleges Admit Most Students Who Apply, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/09/a-
majority-of-u-s-colleges-admit-most-students-who-apply/. 
 124. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,  
397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 136 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 125. Id. at 140. 
 126. Exhibit 55 (Interviewer Handbook) at 9–10, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. 
President & Fellow of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176-
ADB) [hereinafter Interviewer Handbook]. 
 127. Students for Fair Admissions, 397 F. Supp. at 139–40. 
 128. Id. at 138. 
 129. Id. at 140. 
 130. Id. at 142–43 (“Harvard does not decide which applicants to admit based on  
any formula.”). 
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who scores them based on similar metrics.131 Looking at these two 
evaluations, the admissions officers discuss which applicants  
to recommend for admission in subcommittees and then as  
full committees.132 
Though Harvard does not determine admissibility based on a 
fixed formula, clear trends emerge over time. The athletics rating is 
the least stable of the bunch: a score of 1 on athletics means that the 
applicant is a recruited athlete and is almost certain to be 
admitted.133 However, a high score in athletics is not as necessary 
for admission as other metrics; whereas most admitted students 
have scores of 1 or 2 in other metrics, only around 20% of admitted 
students have scores of 1 or 2 in the athletics metric.134 Conversely, 
academic success is necessary, but not sufficient for admission, 
with less than 15% of the non-ALDC applicants in the top decile for 
academic performance being admitted.135 
The ideal Harvard applicant is one who has been groomed.  
This does not necessarily mean that they are a legacy applicant, 
though, as previously established, legacy status can help admission 
chances a great deal. Being groomed, however, means that the 
applicant has been preparing her whole life to be eligible to attend 
Harvard; not only must she be intelligent and personable, she must 
also be “interesting.”136 
The sample candidates Harvard assesses in its interview 
manual as likely to be admitted are “interesting” because they have 
top academic credentials and a full schedule of extracurricular 
activities. One student, given a score 2- in the extracurricular 
activity metric by an interviewer, performs intensive service within 
his community, participates in Model UN, earned his Eagle Scout 
award, and edits the school’s newspaper.137 Another applicant 
swims competitively, volunteers as a swimming coach, and writes 
 
 131. Id. at 137–38. The only difference here is that the interviewer consolidates 
extracurricular and athletics scores into one metric. See id. 
 132. Id. at 140–44. 
 133. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 34 (“The advantages for athletes are especially 
large, with an average admit rate for recruited athletes of 86%.”). 
 134. Id. at 44. 
 135. Id. at 45. 
 136. See David H. Graham, How to Raise a Child Who Will Get into Harvard, QUARTZ 
(July 1, 2014), https://qz.com/228841/how-to-raise-a-child-who-will-get-into-harvard/. 
 137. Interviewer Handbook, supra note 126, at 39–40. The handbook later described the 
assessment as “a bit generous.” Id. at 40. 
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poetry. She’s the president of the Environment Club, an officer in 
her school’s championship-winning Science League team, an 
officer in a service club, and an officer in her school’s Chemistry 
Charter Club.138 This sample candidate was given a 2+ rating for 
her extracurricular participation, a score which the handbook 
remarks was “a bit inflated.”139 Over half of the non-ALDC 
applicants and over 70% of the non-ALDC white and Asian 
American applicants that Harvard admits earn a 1 or 2 in their 
extracurricular score.140 Being “interesting” enough for Harvard 
seems to mean that someone actively participates in multiple clubs 
or has world-class ability in one specific field. 
B. Athletics at Harvard 
Though not traditionally thought of as an athletics 
powerhouse,141 Harvard has 42 NCAA Division I varsity teams, 
more than any other college or university.142 Of Harvard’s roughly 
6,000 undergraduates, 20% participate in intercollegiate athletics.143 
The Ohio State University—a school with almost eight times as 
many enrolled undergraduate students as Harvard and a much 
stronger athletic reputation144—has fewer student athletes than 
Harvard.145 Harvard athletics have been successful, having won 
 
 138. Id. at 41–42. 
 139. Id. at 42. 
 140. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 44. 
 141. See Brad Crawford, Top 25 College Programs Ranked by Athletic Success, 247 SPORTS 
(July 8, 2018), https://247sports.com/ContentGallery/Top-25-college-programs-ranked-by-
athletic-success-119649026/ (Harvard not on the list); 25 Best Colleges for Student Athletes, 
AFFORDABLE SCHS., https://affordableschools.net/25-best-american-colleges-student-
athletes/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (Harvard not on the list); The 30 Most Successful College 
Sports Programs of All Time, BEST COLL. REVS., https://www.bestcollegereviews.org/ 
features/most-successful-college-athletics-programs/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (Harvard 
not on the list). But see Best NCAA Division 1 Colleges, NCSA SPORTS, 
https://www.ncsasports.org/best-colleges/best-division-1-colleges (last visited Sept. 17, 
2020) (Harvard ranked number four on the list of best D1 colleges). 
 142. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 70. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Justin Fox, The Amazing Admissions Advantages for Athletes at the Apex of Academia, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
articles/2019-03-22/athletes-have-huge-college-admissions-advantages (describing Ohio 
State as being “famous as a sports powerhouse”). 
 145. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 70. 
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hundreds of national or NCAA championships,146 performed well 
in competitions against other schools in the Ivy League,147 and 
produced dozens of Olympic athletes.148 Harvard, like other 
schools in the Ivy League, does not give scholarships to its athletes, 
but instead provides robust need-based financial aid regardless of 
athlete status.149 
Colleges within the Ivy League have agreed to only admit 
athletes who fit within the school’s Academic Index (AI).150 Each 
Ivy League applicant is given an AI based on her test scores and 
GPA.151 The average AI of all athletes at an Ivy League school must 
be within one standard deviation of the average AI of the entire 
incoming class. Therefore, Harvard is unlikely to admit an athlete 
with a poor academic record unless the athlete is so exceptionally 
talented at her sport—and the university finds success in that sport 
sufficiently important—as to warrant stricter academic standards 
for other athletes to balance the average AI.152 Though the AI 
creates an academic floor for aspiring Ivy League athletes, it still 
allows schools to use significantly lower academic standards for 
recruited athletes than the general populace. 
Harvard provides limited public details about its process for 
recruiting athletes. Ivy League coaches send lists of potential 
athletic recruits to admissions,153 but how an athlete gets on this list 
is a rather opaque process. Though the illicit bribes to coaches that 
made headlines in the recent “Varsity Blues” scandal are 
 
 146. Athletics Recruiting Central, GO CRIMSON, https://gocrimson.com/sports/2020/ 
5/5/information-recruiting-index.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 147. Jonathan Pollack, A Decade in Ivy League Sports: Ranking the Eight Athletic Programs, 
DAILY PENN. (Aug. 23, 2018, 8:45 PM), https://www.thedp.com/article/2018/08/ivy-
league-athletics-ten-year-update-brown-columbia-cornell-dartmouth-harvard-penn-
princeton-yale-overall-rankings. 
 148. Athletics Recruiting Central, supra note 146; Harvard Athletics Communications, 
Harvard Represented at Olympics, HARV. GAZETTE (July 10, 2012), 
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/07/harvard-represented-at-olympics/. 
 149. Bill Pennington, Financial Aid Changes Game as Ivy Sports Teams Flourish, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/sports/financial-aid-changes-
game-as-sports-teams-in-ivies-rise.html. 
 150. John R. Thelin, Admissions, Athletics and the Academic Index, INSIDE HIGHER ED  
(Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2019/04/03/how-admissions-
and-athletics-intertwine-ivy-league-colleges-opinion. 
 151. Antonio Buehler, The Academic Index at Ivy League Schools, ABROME (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://www.abrome.com/blog/academic-index. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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uncommon,154 the path to an Ivy League coach’s list still tends to 
require a lot of money.155 The disparities in athletic participation 
start early. Children with household incomes over $100,000 
participate in sports at a much higher rate than those with 
household incomes under $25,000.156 White children also 
participate in sports at greater rates than all other races.157 Later, 
wealthy East Coast suburbs and private schools act as pipelines for 
Ivy League athletics, with some private high schools sending 
dozens of athletes to the Ivy League.158 Receiving the training 
necessary to develop skills that can place a student on a coach’s 
recruiting list can require tens of thousands of dollars on 
tutoring.159 Around half of Harvard athletes come from households 
earning more than $250,000 a year, compared to about a third of the 
general student body coming from such households.160 These 
social, geographic, and economic barriers result in a disparate 
impact on racial minorities. 
The table in the appendix compares the racial demographics in 
the Ivy League with Division I sports as a whole.161 The table is 
grouped by each sport for which Harvard fields a team. 
The comparison shows that, while white players make up a 
smaller percentage of Ivy League teams than the national average 
in some of the sports in which Harvard competes, African 
American and Hispanic representation on their teams is generally 
lower than the national average, especially in big-ticket sports like 
 
 154. See Weintraub & Anderson, supra note 16. 
 155. Liam O’Connor, Ivy League Athletics Are the New “Moneyball,” DAILY 
PRINCETONIAN (Oct. 10, 2019, 12:18 AM), http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/article/2019/ 
10/ivy-league-athletics-are-the-new-money-ball. 
 156. Youth Sports Facts: Sports Participation and Physical Activity Rates, ASPEN INST. 
(2019), https://www.aspenprojectplay.org/youth-sports-facts/participation-rates. 
 157. Id. 
 158. O’Connor, supra note 155 (“The Noble and Greenough Schools (annual cost: 
$58,100 for boarding students) had 50 alumni as varsity athletes. Deerfield Academy 
($60,680) came in second with 36 students; Phillips Exeter Academy ($55,402), third, with 32; 
and the Lawrenceville School ($66,360), fourth, with 30.”). 
 159. Saahil Desai, College Sports Are Affirmative Action for Rich White Students, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/10/college-sports-
benefits-white-students/573688/. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Both tables are made using data from NCAA Demographics Database,  
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/ncaa-demographics-database 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
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football and basketball. The lower proportion of white players in 
the Ivy League is balanced out not by a greater proportion of 
Hispanic and African American athletes, but by an increased 
proportion of Asian athletes and individuals who list their race as 
“Other,” which is something of a mystery category.162 Furthermore, 
even if the Ivy League has slightly better representation in some 
“country club sports” like squash and water polo, those sports are 
already predominantly white sports.163 
At Harvard specifically, nearly 70% of recruited athletes are 
white,164 even though less than half of the overall student body is 
white.165 In their statistical model, Arcidiacono et al. predicted that 
removing athlete preferences would cause the number of admitted 
white applicants to decrease by 6%; the number of admitted 
Hispanic applicants to increase by 7%; the number of admitted 
Asian American applicants to increase by 9%; and the number of 
admitted African American applicants to stay constant.166 
Despite the resources Harvard invests in its athletics, few pay 
attention to their programs. Average attendance at Harvard 
football games is about a third of the national average for college 
football.167 Harvard rarely plays teams outside of the Ivy League, 
and any interest in its athletics programs tends to tie back to its 
 
 162. See Sowmiya Ashok, The Rise of the American ‘Others’, ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/the-rise-of-the-others/497690/. 
Individuals who write “Other” on census forms tend to be racially mixed or confused by 
differences in racial and ethnic classifications. Here it could include Middle Eastern or Indian 
athletes who do not associate with the other categories given as options. See Chloe A. 
Shawah, White (Not Including Middle Eastern Origin), HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/3/4/shawah-white-not-including-middle-
eastern/. It could also include individuals who preferred not to disclose their race, for 
whatever reason. 
 163. See O’Connor, supra note 155. 
 164. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 42. 
 165. Meet the Class of 2023, HARV. CRIMSON, https://features.thecrimson.com/ 
2019/freshman-survey/makeup/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
 166. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 32. These effects are generally greater than the 
effect of removing legacy preferences, which Arcidiacono predicts would lower white 
admissions by 4% and increase African American, Hispanic, and Asian American 
admissions by 4%, 5%, and 4%, respectively. Id. at 31–32. 
 167. See Krissy Kowalski, As College Football Attendance Drops Nationwide, Penn Gets 
Creative to Keep Fans Coming, DAILY PENN. (Sept. 11, 2019, 11:49 PM), 
https://www.thedp.com/article/2019/09/penn-football-attendance-history-decline-
college-clemson-princeton-franklin-field; 2018 Football Cumulative Statistics, GO CRIMSON, 
https://gocrimson.com/sports/football/stats/2018 (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
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long-running history rather than what it has done recently.168 
Furthermore, though Harvard does not make its athletic spending 
and revenue public, it is unlikely to be profitable: only a small 
percentage of powerhouse universities boast revenues from their 
athletic programs that exceed their expenses.169 Indeed, Stanford 
recently cut many of its niche athletic programs—including 
country club sports like squash, rowing, and sailing—citing 
funding concerns exacerbated by COVID-19.170 
Nevertheless, Ivy League schools continue to develop their 
athletics programs. There are several possible reasons for this: 
perhaps they believe strong athletic programs will increase alumni 
donations or the university’s outreach.171 Some studies have 
connected a university’s athletic success with an increased number 
of applicants with high test scores.172 However, Ivy League 
schools—especially Harvard173—work with huge endowments 
and, given their already rigorous admissions rates, would likely be 
unaffected by a drop in applicants with high test scores 
discouraged from attendance because of a weak athletics 
program.174 The value of dedicating so many admissions spots and 
so much money to athletics is therefore suspect. 
 
 168. See John Powers, Why Harvard Football Still Matters, HARV. GAZETTE  
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/09/why-harvard-football-
still-matters/. 
 169. Brian Burnsed, Growth in Division I Athletics Expenses Outpaces Revenue Increases, 
NCAA (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:04 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/growth-division-i-athletics-expenses-outpaces-revenue-increases. 
 170. Alex Scarborough, Stanford to Cut 11 Varsity Sports, Cites Pandemic as  
Breaking Point, ESPN (July 8, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/ 
29429478/stanford-cut-11-varsity-sports-cites-pandemic-breaking-point. 
 171. See Desai, supra note 159. 
 172. Michael L. Anderson, The Benefits of College Athletic Success: An Application of the 
Propensity Score Design with Instrumental Variables (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working 
Paper No. 18196, 2012), https://www.nber.org/papers/w18196.pdf. 
 173. Harvard’s endowment is valued at over $40 billion. Ellen M. Burstein & Camille 
G. Caldera, Who Does Harvard’s Endowment Serve?, HARV. CRIMSON (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2020/5/27/commencement-2020-endowment/. 
 174. Id. 
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C. Challenging Athlete Admissions Under Title VI 
To successfully challenge Harvard’s athlete preferences,175 
potential plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case by 
showing that the preferences have a disparate impact on the basis 
of race that is sufficiently substantial to raise an inference of 
causation.176 Here, the inference of causation is strong: 69% of 
athletic tips go to white students, even though only 40% of Harvard 
applicants are white.177 This data, coupled with Arcidiacono et al.’s 
finding that removing athlete preferences would increase Asian 
American and Hispanic admissions by a significant amount,178 
would show a strong inference of causation and likely establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact. 
However, Harvard is likely to succeed in its educational 
necessity defense. To rebut the established prima facie case, 
Harvard need only point to institutional goals that its athlete 
preferences help it achieve. The court recognized in SFFA v. Harvard 
that eliminating tips for athletes at Harvard would make it “far less 
competitive in Ivy League intercollegiate sports, which would 
adversely impact Harvard and the student experience.”179 Alumni 
donations and involvement could decline.180 Harvard could argue 
it has historical interests in maintaining high-quality athletic 
programs. Because of the deference that courts give defendants in 
this stage of analysis, any one of these individual claims would 
likely establish educational necessity. 
Having successfully rebutted the prima facie claim, Harvard 
would then shift the burden to the plaintiffs to present a less 
discriminatory and equally effective alternative.181 Though there 
are many possible less discriminatory alternatives to Harvard’s 
current scheme of athletic recruitment, they would likely require 
 
 175. This challenger would likely need to be the Department of Education. Alexander 
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282–83 (2001). 
 176. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988). 
 177. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 42. See supra note 109 for a discussion of 
possible variances in the proportion of Harvard applicants who are white. Even going with 
the higher number provided by Harvard—56%—there would still likely be a strong 
inference of causation. 
 178. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 32. 
 179. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,  
397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019), No. 19-2005 (1st Cir. argued Sept. 16, 2020). 
 180. Id. at 179–80; Anderson, supra note 172. 
 181. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 34, at 184. 
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Harvard to admit athletes of a lower quality or violate its 
agreements with the Ivy League Conference to recruit athletes 
within its Academic Index. Because the alternatives are not equally 
effective, plaintiffs’ claim would fail. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF 
HARVARD ATHLETICS 
Despite being able to construct a strong prima facie claim of 
disparate impact on the basis of race, current judicial 
interpretations of Title VI would prevent plaintiffs from 
successfully litigating Harvard’s athlete admissions policy. In this 
Part, I suggest legislation that would expand Title VI to permit 
applicants to challenge such policies in a reasonable manner. In the 
next Part, I propose different policies Harvard itself could adopt 
that could address racial disparities more directly. 
The first and most important change that must be made to 
combat the discriminatory effects of admissions policies is to 
amend Title VI to create a private cause of action for disparate 
impact claims under Title VI, effectively overruling Sandoval. This 
would allow private plaintiffs to challenge disparate impact 
without needing to go through Department of Education 
investigation procedures or wait until a more sympathetic 
president is in office.182 Such a change would echo the development 
of Title VII, which was amended with the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.183 
Following in step with Title VII improvements from the  
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the amendment to Title VI should also 
require defendants to better substantiate their educational 
necessity defense.184 However, a Title VI amendment should go 
further than the present state of Title VII,185 explicitly stating that 
the burden of proof lies with the defendant to establish that the 
 
 182. See supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of 
how the lack of a private cause of action complicates Title VI disparate impact challenges 
and jurisprudential development. 
 183. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory Alternatives in Disparate 
Impact Litigation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1625 (1993). 
 184. Id. (“Congress rejected the Court’s shift of the business-necessity burden of proof 
to the plaintiff. The Act is vague, however, with respect to the degree to which defendants 
must substantiate their business-necessity defense . . . .”) 
 185. Title VII could also be strengthened by similar clarification. 
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effectively discriminatory program has a direct link to the claimed 
educational necessity. 
To meet their burden of proof, I propose a two-step test. 
Defendants would have to prove: (1) that their effectively 
discriminatory practice improves the program in question and 
(2) that the success of that program is key to the institution’s 
mission. The evidentiary standards here are not meant to be 
exacting, but rather looked at with a similar level of skepticism that 
courts use when looking at quasi-suspect classes like disability or 
marital status.186 As such, universities will have to prove that their 
programs with a disparate impact are at least somewhat tailored to 
a legitimate academic goal. 
Under this standard, judges would have to evaluate the 
substance of the evidence defendants provide. For example, over 
the course of its litigation against SFFA, Harvard formed several 
committees to look into the advantages of diversity on its campus 
and possible race-neutral methods of improving diversity.187 They 
ultimately concluded that none of the race-neutral practices they 
analyzed, including removing athlete admissions, could improve 
diversity while still maintaining Harvard’s high “standards of 
excellence.”188 In her trial court opinion, Judge Burroughs took 
these findings at face value, neglecting to analyze whether  
Harvard has legitimate interests in maintaining its current slate of 
athletic programs.189 
The first step of my proposed test would require Harvard to 
provide evidence of how its recruitment process would lead to 
greater athletic success, and that athletic success is integral to 
Harvard’s mission as a university. Harvard could likely meet this 
standard by showing how its increased recruiting efforts improved 
its athletic standings or mentioning specific athletes that would not 
 
 186. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (using “rational 
basis with a bite” analysis in a disability discrimination claim); Eisenstadt v. Baird,  
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (using “rational basis with a bite” analysis in a marital status 
discrimination claim); see also Nancy M. Reininger, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center: Rational Basis with a Bite?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 927 (1986). 
 187. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,  
397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 149–53 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 188. Id. at 153. 
 189. Id. at 171. 
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have been admitted without the recruitment tip who then helped 
their teams have success.190 
To meet the second component of this test, Harvard could show 
that athletic programs are an essential aspect of the student 
experience or provide quantitative data to show its athletics inspire 
enough alumni donations and generate enough prestige or 
community involvement to justify their continued use. However, 
the standard would at least require Harvard to demonstrate that its 
athletics programs have the benefits it claims they have, which the 
current standard merely takes as a given. 
On its own, this standard would be unlikely to dismantle a 
university’s entire athletics recruitment program, nor should it be 
able to.191 Giving courts the authority to strike down university 
admissions practices would move the court too far into the territory 
of educational policymaking.192 Furthermore, this statute would be 
limited in the same ways as Title VI. For example, the Department 
of Education could not use the statute to force admissions policy 
changes on private universities but would instead condition federal 
funding on compliance. 
However, this test would be more successful on a program-by-
program basis. Though dismantling elite athletics as a whole would 
constitute legislative overreach, litigants could use this statute to 
force universities to recalibrate programs that are played by 
predominantly white athletes and that generate little income or 
renown for the university. 
Additionally, this standard could prove sufficient to strike 
down admissions preferences for legacy, dean’s list, and children 
of faculty (LDC). Because the disparate impact of LDC policies 
admissions is clear and the financial benefits of keeping them are 
somewhat ambiguous, LDC preferences would be unlikely to 
withstand judicial scrutiny unless the defending university could 
 
 190. See Powers, supra note 168. 
 191. See Students for Fair Admissions, 397 F. Supp. at 180 (“The Court notes that 
reasonable minds can differ on the importance of college athletics, alumni relations, and 
admitting the children of faculty and staff, but takes no position on these issues other than 
to note that these are topics best left to schools to figure out for themselves.”). 
 192. See Braceras, supra note 29, at 1193. For this reason, legislatures should not change 
the “equally effective and less discriminatory” standard currently employed by courts. 
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somehow demonstrate that legacy preferences are integral to the 
university’s mission.193 
A. Addressing Counterarguments 
This proposed legislation could theoretically be used by 
advocacy groups to try to eliminate admissions policies that have 
the effect of discriminating against white people, like diversity 
scholarships, but it is unlikely to be effective in most situations. 
Because the Supreme Court has recognized universities have an 
interest in diversity that is compelling enough to withstand strict 
scrutiny,194 challenges to affirmative action under a statute that 
requires a lower level of scrutiny would be much less likely to  
be successful. 
Similarly, challenges to race-neutral policies that universities 
have implemented to improve diversity, like allowing students to 
apply without disclosing standardized test scores,195 would 
withstand scrutiny as long as universities can demonstrate the 
policy had the effect of improving diversity. Challenges to athletic 
admissions preferences that have the effect of discriminating 
against white applicants by admitting a disproportionate amount 
of minority athletes would also be able to withstand scrutiny as 
long as the university can demonstrate a legitimate academic 
interest in the success of the challenged athletic team and that their 
recruiting policies improve the team. Schools unable to meet this 
evidentiary standard would be required to modify their 
recruitment preferences to ensure white applicants are not 
disadvantaged without a legitimate purpose. However, this forced 
change could ultimately have a positive result for diversity, 
requiring universities to use more generally applicable means to 
achieve diversity than athlete preferences.196 
 
 193. See supra Section II.B for an explanation of the discriminatory effect of  
legacy admissions. 
 194. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2203 (2016) (“[T]he decision to 
pursue the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity is, in substantial 
measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial defense is 
proper.”) (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013)). 
 195. See Tough, supra note 97. 
 196. See John Percy Boyd, The Affirmative Action Athlete Dilemma, 33 BLACK SCHOLAR 26, 
26–28 (2003) (arguing athletics should not be the only means of creating diversity at 
universities and that doing so disadvantages black applicants academically). 
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Professor Braceras has criticized using disparate impact theory 
in the educational sphere because she argues it would ultimately 
give the judiciary too much discretion in education without 
promising greater “clarity or consistency.”197 Though judges have 
employed disparate impact standards in Title VII analysis 
relatively effectively, Braceras argues educational needs are too 
subjective for courts to evaluate.198 
A distrust of the judiciary is natural,199 but Braceras thinks too 
little of the courts’ ability. This proposed legislation would not 
require judges to become experts in education policy any more than 
current judiciary standards in other fields. For example, when 
evaluating challenges to state abortion laws, courts must balance 
the legitimacy of a state’s goals and its policies’ effectiveness in 
carrying out those goals with their adverse effects.200 These 
proposed standards are even less exacting for judges than those 
used in direct discrimination, where judges have been required to 
balance interests of similar policies but with an even greater level 
of scrutiny and authority.201 If a tailoring analysis constitutes 
judicial policymaking, then Braceras’s problem lies not with 
tailoring but rather a common law judiciary. 
V. INTERNAL CHANGES TO MAKE AT HARVARD 
Harvard itself could make a host of policy changes to its 
admissions process that would lessen the disparate impact of its 
athlete preferences. Though each of these changes would likely 
decrease the competitiveness of Harvard’s athletics programs, 
Harvard could mitigate this issue by negotiating with the other 
schools in the Ivy League to adopt equivalent policies. Because 
Harvard rarely competes outside of the Ivy League, its strength 
relative to other schools in the league matters more than its overall 
athletic strength. 
The simplest change that Harvard could make would be to 
combine the Extracurricular and Athletic metrics in its applicant 
 
 197. Braceras, supra note 29, at 1194, 1196–97. 
 198. Id. at 1192. 
 199. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 200. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 201. See Students for Fair Admissions v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,  
397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 191–95 (D. Mass. 2019), No. 19-2005 (1st Cir. argued Sept. 16, 2020). 
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ratings system, as they already are for alumni interviewers.202 
Instead of measuring applicants solely on how effectively they use 
their time, Harvard’s rating system gives preferences to athletic 
experience, even for those who are not admitted athletes. In the 
system’s current state, an individual with strong community 
service credentials would likely benefit more from athletic 
participation—thus seeming more well-rounded in the eyes of 
Harvard admissions—than picking up a job or editing the school 
newspaper, both of which would count as extracurricular activities. 
This stacks the system in favor of those who are informed and 
privileged enough to frame their high school experience around Ivy 
League admission as opposed to those who merely want to be 
productive. Though each metric is not weighed equally, and 
candidates are evaluated holistically, the lower ratings Asian 
Americans receive for the Athletics metric in comparison to white 
applicants is a commonly cited reason for their low admissions  
rate at Harvard.203 The separation between the two metrics has  
little justification. 
More drastically, Harvard could cut athletic recruitment 
entirely. Though it could still field teams, it could not grant special 
athlete preferences. Harvard’s rating system would likely give high 
extracurricular ratings to applicants who would have otherwise 
been recruits, but, per Arcidiacono et al.’s model, cutting the added 
tip to athletes would significantly improve diversity at Harvard.204 
However, Harvard’s athletic competitiveness would likely drop. 
Perhaps a more reasonable compromise is for Harvard to keep 
athletic recruitment only for sports with low barriers to 
participation, like football, basketball, and track and field. Because 
these sports are played across the country at thousands of high 
schools, an applicant can acquire the skills necessary to be recruited 
onto an Ivy League team without needing to go to an expensive 
private school or receive personal tutoring.205 This would decrease 
the disparate impact of Harvard’s athlete preference by requiring 
 
 202. See supra Section III.A for an explanation of Harvard’s applicant ratings system. 
 203. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. 397 F. Supp. 3d at 162 (“On average, Asian 
American applicants are . . . assigned lower athletic ratings, particularly compared to white 
applicants, who average especially strong athletic ratings.”). 
 204. Arcidiacono et al., supra note 16, at 32. 
 205. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text for an explanation of the 
socioeconomic hurdles to compete in Harvard’s “country club sports.” 
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athletes in wealthier, whiter sports to be admitted based on other 
metrics. As previously mentioned, Stanford instituted an even 
more drastic policy, cutting many of its country club sports 
entirely.206 Though it cited budget cuts, Stanford’s decision to cut 
programs the year after many of them were used to facilitate an 
admissions bribery scandal is unlikely a coincidence.207 
Another change that Harvard could make would be to require 
the average AI for its athletes to be the same as the rest of the school 
and not one standard deviation below.208 Though this would likely 
have a similarly gutting effect to programs as cutting their 
recruitment tips entirely, it would still allow coaches some level of 
discretion in balancing the academic profiles of their recruits. 
CONCLUSION 
At first glance, disparities in athlete admissions may not seem 
like a significant problem. Indeed, the minority students crowded 
out of Harvard by athletes are still immensely bright and qualified 
students that will likely be accepted at some other prestigious 
institution. Nevertheless, a rejection from Harvard closes a student 
off from a clear path to the upper echelons of society—not only high 
income,209 but also an elite network of presidents, judges, and 
celebrities.210 An Ivy League degree is not required for success, but 
it sure helps. 
Furthermore, discriminatory admissions practices—no matter 
how small—add yet another obstacle to the success of already 
disadvantaged minorities. Minorities are crowded out of elite 
universities in the same way they are crowded out of business and 
 
 206. Scarborough, supra note 170. 
 207. See Weintraub & Anderson, supra note 16. 
 208. See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text for an explanation of AI. 
 209. The median annual pay for graduates of Harvard ten years following graduation 
is $129,000; the median of graduates of all Ivy League schools is $124,600; and the median 
for non-Ivy League college graduates is $81,600. Aimee Picchi, Harvard’s Admissions Trial:  
The Value of a Harvard Diploma, CBS NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018, 4:28 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/harvards-admissions-trial-the-value-of-a-harvard-diploma/. 
 210. Id. 
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politics211 and in the same way they are crowded into prisons.212 
Racism in America is a tapestry; though the harm of each individual 
thread may appear negligible, our society has woven these threads 
into an oppressive canvas. 
The policies—in schools, corporations, and governments—that 
perpetuate these outcomes may not be overtly racist, but their 
effects are racist all the same.213 To achieve racial equity, we must 
tear out each thread that forms the tapestry of American racism. 
Universities’ use of athlete preferences may be but one thread, yet 
it is a thread all the same. 
Our current legislative framework is unable to combat the 
disparate racial impact of athlete preferences and similarly 
discriminatory admissions policies. As such, Congress must 
expand litigants’ capabilities under Title VI. Specifically, Congress 
should allow private parties to bring forth disparate impact claims 
and require schools to meet a stricter level of scrutiny to 




 211. Jeanne Sahadi, After Years of Talking About Diversity, the Number of Black Leaders at 
US Companies Is Still Dismal, CNN (June 2, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2020/06/02/success/diversity-and-black-leadership-in-corporate-america/index.html; 
Daniel Weeks, Why Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote? ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-and-
minorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/. 
 212. See, e.g., DJ Silton, U.S. Prisons and Racial Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a 
Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53 (2002); Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial 
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000). 
 213. See IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 18 (2019) (defining a racist policy 
as “any measure that produces or sustains racial inequity between racial groups”). 
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Table 1: Racial Demographics of Ivy League Athletics Teams214 
 












 Ivy All Ivy All Ivy All Ivy All Ivy All Ivy All Ivy All Ivy All Ivy All 
Men’s Baseball 72.9 77.0 1.6 6.1 0.0 0.5 3.1 0.9 2.0 7.5 0.0 0.2 7.1 3.8 0.4 0.8 12.9 3.2 
Men’s Basketball 40.3 23.8 32.4 56.4 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.4 2.2 2.0 0.0 0.1 8.6 5.5 2.2 8.5 12.9 3.1 
Men’s Cross Country 63.8 68.9 5.8 9.4 0.0 0.4 4.3 1.2 2.9 7.9 0.5 0.2 5.3 3.4 1.9 5.5 15.5 3.2 
Men’s Fencing 44.2 52.0 6.3 5.1 0.0 0.0 22.1 16.8 3.2 6.3 0.0 0.0 5.3 7.1 2.1 6.3 16.8 6.3 
Men’s Football 54.1 37.3 22.8 48.5 0.4 0.4 1.2 0.4 2.8 3.0 0.1 1.5 4.9 5.4 0.7 0.5 12.9 3.0 
Men’s Golf 44.3 69.0 1.4 2.1 0.0 0.2 17.1 5.5 0 3.0 0.0 0.3 10.0 2.2 10.0 13.8 17.1 3.9 
Men’s Ice Hockey 66.9 67.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.4 1.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.5 11.2 24.0 17.2 5.0 
Men’s Lacrosse 74.1 81.8 3.1 2.7 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5 2.2 2.5 0.0 0.2 1.6 2.1 2.2 3.8 15.9 5.8 
Men’s Rowing215 62.1 71.3 0.5 1.1 0.3 0.2 3.8 2.3 3.3 4.3 0.3 0.2 3.6 3.3 8.8 7.2 17.3 10.1 
Men’s Sailing216 84.6 81.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 5.1 3.0 2.6 2.2 0.0 0.9 7.7 4.7 0.0 0.4 0.0 6.9 
Men’s Skiing 81.6 74.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 2.0 7.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.7 0.0 20.1 0.0 0.7 
Men’s Soccer 56.1 49.4 7.7 10 0.0 0.2 5.4 1.4 5.4 12.3 0.0 0.2 6.8 4.3 1.4 18.2 14 3.9 
Men’s Squash 50.8 56.2 2.3 1.9 0.8 0.5 13.1 9.5 1.5 2.4 0.0 0.0 3.1 4.3 8.6 12.4 18.5 12.9 
Men’s Swimming & Diving 54.6 71.8 1.2 1.9 0.0 0.2 16.3 4.2 1.2 5.2 0.0 0.1 6.4 4.5 1.8 8.5 15.5 3.6 
Men’s Tennis 50.5 39.4 1.0 3.5 0.0 0.1 15.5 4.9 1.0 6.3 0.0 0.3 7.8 3.1 1.2 38.2 14.6 4.2 
Men’s Track & Field 53.0 52.8 14.2 26.4 0.0 0.3 3.8 1.3 2.7 5.4 0.2 0.2 8.2 4.8 2.8 4.9 16 4.0 
Men’s Volleyball 41.9 68.8 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 3.5 3.2 7.2 1.4 4.6 51.6 6.5 
Men’s Water Polo 43.9 68.9 1.7 1.0 0.0 0.5 8.6 3.1 1.7 6.9 0.0 0.3 10.3 5.4 0.0 7.3 34.5 6.1 
Men’s Wrestling 62.9 73.8 4.8 6.6 1.1 0.6 2.7 1.4 2.7 7.8 0.0 0.2 5.9 4.1 0.0 0.2 19.9 5.4 
Women’s Basketball 57.5 31.6 15.8 46.7 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.5 1/7 2.6 0.0 0.5 5.8 6.7 1.7 7.7 15.8 3.3 
Women’s Cross Country 73.8 71.3 0.4 7.9 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 6.9 0.0 0.2 6.0 3.3 2.6 5.3 14.6 3.6 
Women’s Fencing 39.6 48.1 5.4 5.2 0.0 0.2 21.6 14.5 3.6 6.2 0.0 0.2 7.2 7.8 5.4 8.5 17.1 9.2 
Women’s Field Hockey 67.9 75.2 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.2 3.8 1.5 2.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.4 6.3 11.4 16.4 5.8 
Women’s Golf 19.3 53.4 10.0 2.8 0.0 0.2 54.4 12.2 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.7 3.5 2.8 7.0 21.7 15.8 2.8 
Women’s Ice Hockey 57.2 64.7 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.4 2.9 0.7 2.2 0.8 0.0 0.1 12.0 2.0 17.4 26.3 1.2 4.6 
Women’s Lacrosse 79.8 84.1 1.6 2.8 0.0 0.5 1.6 0.9 0.8 2.7 0.0 0.1 5.1 3.0 0.0 1.3 14.5 4.7 
 
 214. Data consolidated from NCAA Demographics Database, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/ncaa-demographics-database (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2020). 
 215.  Harvard fields two rowing teams for each gender: Heavyweight Crew and 
Lightweight Crew. NCAA data consolidates the two. 
 216. Harvard also fields a women’s sailing team, but NCAA does not provide 
demographic data for it. 
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Women’s Rowing 61.7 73.4 2.0 2.1 0.2 0.4 3.5 3.2 2.4 4.9 0.0 0.1 2.0 4.1 4.4 4.9 14.3 7.0 
Women’s Rugby 47.2 56.5 14.8 16.4 0.0 0.0 9.3 5.6 7.4 6.5 0.0 1.7 4.9 6.9 5.6 3.0 20.8 3.4 
Women’s Skiing 100 76.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 19.6 0.9 1.4 
Women’s Soccer 54.9 68.7 10.7 7.0 0.0 0.3 4.2 1.3 4.7 7.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 5.4 1.4 6.6 0.0 2.9 
Women’s Softball 62.7 69.4 0.0 7.6 0.0 0.8 3.8 1.4 8.9 10.1 1.3 0.9 7.4 7.3 0.0 0.5 16.7 2.2 
Women’s Squash 56.9 58.8 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 11.2 9.4 1.7 1.2 0.0 0.0 11.4 3.5 8.6 12.4 12.0 14.1 
Women’s Swimming & Diving 57.2 75.7 0.7 1.3 0.0 0.3 16.2 3.8 2.2 3.4 0.0 0.2 4.3 3.8 1.8 7.6 16.4 3.9 
Women’s Tennis 41.0 38.5 3.6 4.9 0.0 0.3 33.7 5.9 1.2 4.8 0.0 0.3 6.1 3.6 1.2 37.4 15.8 4.3 
Women’s Track & Field 58.4 53.5 13.9 27.1 0.4 0.4 2.1 1.2 1.9 4.4 0.2 0.3 6.0 5.0 2.8 5.1 13.3 3.2 
Women’s Volleyball 62.7 64.6 7.0 14.8 0.0 0.4 7.0 1.1 2.1 4.5 0.7 0.9 6.0 5.9 1.4 5.1 14.3 2.8 
Women’s Water Polo 38.9 62.7 3.7 1.7 0.0 0.7 7.4 1.9 5.6 10.9 0.0 0.8 5.6 7.6 0.0 8.4 13.4 5.4 
 
